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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of asymmetric
information on the purchase of high-value infrequently
traded assets. If a high-value asset is infrequently traded
in a market its valuation becomes less predictable and
more tension can exist between the vendor and the
purchaser. Often the vendor possesses more knowledge
of the asset, which leads to an asymmetric information
paradigm between the two parties, nurturing a dark side
of information and knowledge management. Using the
New Zealand real estate industry as the context of a
design science research study, a purchase decision
process model for high-value infrequently traded assets
has been developed. It aims to support the novice real
estate purchaser to realise the potential pitfalls they
should avoid. The study also calls for a unified system
with codifiable, explicit information that can be used by
all stakeholders in high-value infrequently transactions.
Thus reducing the asymmetric information imbalance
between vendor and purchaser.

1. Introduction
Trading goods is part of human existence and has
always created tension between vendor and purchaser.
This tension is particularly apparent in high-value assets
with information that is hard to ascertain. The misuse of
asymmetric information has been the cornerstone for
many a charlatan and has allowed snake oil to be
pedalled throughout history.
A purchaser that infrequently purchases a high-value
asset through an intermediary is at a particular
disadvantage. They face an increased risk of forming a
purchase decision based on information that can’t be
relied on to adjust their assumptions or actions [5]. The
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infrequency of trading and asymmetric information
disproportionately advantages the vendor (or
intermediary) in the sale of a high-value asset with
specialised proprietary knowledge.
Furthermore, the vendor can also take advantage of
the noise in the communication channel [19]. When
purchase decisions are affected by such noise and are
not verifiable, it can lead to a long-lasting financial
impact and could be hard to revert a purchase legally.
Most governments have laws in place to prevent blatant
misuse of asymmetric information in trading. For
example, the United States has a "Lemon Law"
(Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 1975) that protects the
purchaser from defective goods and enforcing implied
warranties. New Zealand has the Fair Trading Act
(1986) to protect consumers. However, it is in the
margins of the law, which are hard to prove, where
much financial hardship could occur. Besides, there are
further problems with acquiring the necessary
information,
such
as
their
codifiability,
comprehensibility, reliability, and relevancy [15]. To
resolve these issues, it naturally calls for a knowledge
base filled with well-defined, historically complete,
trustworthy and meaningful, timestamped records
representing each of the high-value infrequently traded
assets.
Over the past 150 years, dating back to the industrial
revolution, we have used a linear economic model
where goods are manufactured from raw materials and
sold, used and thrown away. In the last 15 years there is
a groundswell for moving to a circular economy where
the added value of products is held for as long as
possible to reduce waste. Such a concept re-imagines
how the material flows through the economy might be
closed [18]. This should apply to data as well; critical
information associated with a high-value infrequently
traded asset is not just gathered for one time and
discarded, instead it remains in the knowledge base for
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as long as possible ensuring the proverbial wheel is not
reinvented many times.
In this paper, we first delve into understanding
information asymmetry and knowledge. We then look at
information asymmetry of high-value infrequently
traded assets in the context of the real estate industry.
We conduct our study using New Zealand as an
exemplar. We develop practical models that could be
generalised to other industries to reduce information
asymmetry between vendor and purchaser. Finally, we
discuss how a purchaser could benefit from these
models.

2. Information Asymmetry and Knowledge
Problems relating to information asymmetry going
back to the eighteenth century have been discussed.
According to Stiglitz [20] information is not perfect,
obtaining information is costly, and there is always a
degree of information asymmetry among competitive
markets. The extent of this is associated with actions of
individuals and organisations. Information asymmetry
in a competitive market gives an advantage to one party
while disadvantaging the other.
The literature is clear on the negative outcomes
associated with asymmetric information particularly for
the purchaser. However, there is little known about the
role of asymmetric information in transactions of highvalue low-frequency assets, and how it could affect the
purchaser decision process. This is the gap in the
literature that we plan to ameliorate.
The study of information and knowledge covers a
vast domain of literature as it applies to a large number
of academic disciplines. The basic definition of
knowledge often used among epistemologists is that of
Plato, describing a proposition that knowledge is present
when truth intersects with belief and becomes a justified
belief. Ackoff [1] argues that the primary goal of
gaining knowledge is to progress towards wisdom.
Knowledge is obtained by formalising facts and ideas,
processing them into information, and converting them
to
knowledge
[8].
Tuomi
[21]
describes
contextualisation as a driving force to understand the
data to knowledge transformation. Along the same lines,
Carpenter and Cannady [7] add environment as a
prerequisite to data, and vision as an outcome of
wisdom. Most conceptual models of knowledge are
linear; perhaps a circular model would be more
appropriate, especially if understanding and context are
continuously changing and affecting each other as is the
case of high-value infrequent traded assets. There is also
a lack of practicality and measurability [12] among
those conceptual models for our purpose.

Furthermore, knowledge is either tacit or explicit
[3]. Nonaka and Takeuchi [17] define tacit knowledge
as "personal knowledge embedded in individual
experience and involves intangible factors such as
personal beliefs, perspective and value systems," and
explicit knowledge could be expressed in code and is not
subject to multiple interpretations. Tacit knowledge is
either "has not" been formalised or "could not be”
formalised. Once knowledge is formalised, it becomes
explicit [13]. In the context of purchasing high-value
infrequently traded assets, the information asymmetry
could appear within the realm of tacit knowledge. The
unverifiable statements made to a purchaser, for
instance, are hard to verify and even harder to rectify
after a purchase. This leads us to the question of
whether we could reduce the amount of tacit knowledge
and increase the amount of explicit knowledge, held on
a property for instance, and how it could be managed
and shared.
Knowledge management systems often focus on the
sharing of information within an organisation.
According to Brooking [6], knowledge management is
the process by which we manage human-centred assets.
The function of knowledge management is to guard and
grow knowledge owned by individuals and, where
possible, transfer the asset into a form where others can
more readily share it. But the difficulty faced by
knowledge management systems is to codify tacit
knowledge into explicit knowledge [9].
If knowledge exists ultimately within individuals,
and individuals are participating simultaneously in
multiple group processes to make and execute critical
decisions, then a fundamental of "managing knowledge"
must be to build some degree of shared context [10].
Alavi and Leidner [3] study the objective of knowledge
management systems to support the creation, transfer,
and application of knowledge. After creating a shared
context, translating tacit knowledge into explicit
knowledge, and building a reliable knowledge
management system, there will be a need for presenting
the information in a uniform way that can be understood
by a large segment of the population relying on them to
make educated decisions.
Selling and buying high-value infrequently traded
assets involving multi-stakeholders is seen as a finite,
zero-sum game. Within this context, we focus on the
New Zealand real estate industry as a domain with
conflicting objectives among vendors, intermediaries
and purchasers. And we highlight the processes that
involve counterbalancing information asymmetry on
these high-value low-frequency transactions. While the
focus is on the New Zealand real estate industry, these
issues arise in many high-value low-frequency asset
transactions in various domains throughout the world.
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3. The Study
We scope our investigation to the New Zealand real
estate industry as it has several unique features. For
instance, nearly a third of New Zealanders use real
estate as one of their primary, long-term, investment
strategies. To compound matters, a purchaser of real
estate in New Zealand does not have a dedicated agent
to work on their behalf, rather they depend on the
vendor's agent to assist with the transaction.
In our study, we purposefully focused on the novice
residential real estate purchaser and how, potentially,
they could be disadvantaged from making purchase
decision with information asymmetry in high-value
infrequently traded transactions. We identified six types
of stakeholders in the real estate industry and used an
interpretive lens as our philosophical assumption.
Initially, we conducted semi-structured interviews to
collect empirical data on how experienced real estate
agents would buy a property for themselves. We also
interviewed four experienced developers to gain an
understanding of how decisions were made for buying
land or property. This empirical data was used to create
a Model of Communication and a Purchaser Decision
Process Model to support a novice purchaser buying real
estate. These artefacts were then assessed and analysed
using a focus group, resulting in a further refined Model
of Communication (Figure 1) and the Purchaser
Decision Process Model (Figure 2). Next, two rounds
of semi-structured interviews were conducted with two
employees of a real estate agency in New Zealand, both
having over 20 years of experience. One of the
interviewees had sold over 400 residential properties
while the other was a licensed real estate agent who
handled the administrative processes of finalising
transactions. The initial interviews covered the entire
process of purchasing real estate in New Zealand.
Subsequently, we divided this process into six stages
and it is introduced in a later section. The primary aim
of the interviews was to identify all the stakeholders
involved in each stage of the real estate purchasing
process and the questions that needed to be addressed by
a purchaser at each stage. The second round of
interviews was held with the same interviewees aiming
to classify all the questions into hard and soft criteria.
The criteria were explained to the candidates as
measurable (tacit) or non-measurable answers (explicit).
The hard and soft criteria were then synthesised into the
two models (Model of Communication and the
Purchaser Decision Process Model) as tacit and explicit
information. With regard to the Purchaser Decision
Process Model (Figure 2), we translated the findings and
developed a roadmap to purchasing real estate in New
Zealand (Figure 3). These artefacts, namely the model
and roadmap, were then further refined and validated by

a focus group that met twice. The focus group consisted
of six members with diverse backgrounds ranging from
novice to experienced investors aged between 24 to 52.
These members also had a mixture of cultural
backgrounds and experiences of real estate purchases
outside of New Zealand.
The semi-structured interviews with the domain
experts and the considerations from the series of focus
groups resulted in a model of communication and a
decision process roadmap that could be practically
implemented to support novice real estate purchasers to
ask the right questions when purchasing real estate.

4. Research Artefacts
In New Zealand, there are multiple stakeholders
involved in collecting information about a real estate
property. There are also conflicting objectives among
the government, council, specialist, and real estate
organisation. There is a discrepancy between property
files held by the council and the Land Information
Memorandum (LIM). A purchaser would typically hire
specialists such as a building expert, engineer, surveyor
and others during the due diligence period. They collect
enormous amounts of data related to a property without
any obligation to register this information. If the sale
does not result in an unconditional offer, the information
collected will be lost. Multiple specialists with different
outcomes can sometimes perform these information
collection exercise multiple times for the same property.
There is also much-biased information given on a
verbal basis, often through real estate agents. An
example could be "the house has just been painted." The
information could be more value-added to a purchaser if
the company name is mentioned, the date it happened,
the warranty on the kind of paint that was used and the
cost of the paint job. Interestingly, the majority of
information about a property is often given verbally by
a real estate agent. Furthermore, there is a possibility of
adding an "owners" database to a property file that could
be linked to the LIM and therefore become part of the
property file itself.
It has also been established by Allmon and Grant [4]
that as the principal intermediary, the real estate agent,
does not always have the best interest in mind for both
the purchaser and the vendor. The primary driver for a
real estate agent is the actual property sale. Their key
performance indicators (KPI) are number of listings,
number of potential purchasers, and sales volume.
Hence, they do not always align with the best interests
of purchasers.
Purchasing and selling real estate in New Zealand is
becoming more complex. New rules and regulations are
introduced and more and more of the responsibilities are
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delegated to the real estate agent and the purchaser.
Once the initial price negotiation is completed there is
often a deadline to finish the due diligence of the sale by
the purchaser.
The real estate industry can be identified by multiple
stakeholders with conflicting objectives in a finite, zerosum game typically involving many intermediaries to
obtain a satisfactory transaction between a vendor and a
purchaser. For a purchaser, there is the added
complexity of finding all the right documents needed to
make an informed decision on a real estate transaction
and conduct proper due diligence. Currently, there is a
property file that can be requested from the council with
all the consent notices, forms, code of compliances and
reports they have on file for a particular property. This
is summarised in a LIM and can be purchased for
approximately NZD$200 to NZD$400 and gives
consents, legal description, lands use, zoning, utilities.
The property file and LIM do not always correlate and
sometimes have critical information missing.
The information presented in a LIM has a legal
caveat that the council is not liable and cannot guarantee
the accuracy of the information. Furthermore, the LIM
is not printed with any page numbers leaving it
susceptible to manipulation. A purchaser then needs to
obtain a title that gives caveats, covenants, mortgages,
etc., lodged
the title. Information
There are multitudes
Tacitagainst
and Explicit
Flow of

reports that can be requested. Moisture report, asbestos
report, electrician report, builders report, soil test,
archaeological test, drainage report, geo-tech report,
valuation report, etc. These reports are paid for by a
purchaser and are not reported back to the council. This
can result in the same report being requested multiple
times and sometimes overlooked completely. In buying
a property, there is a lot of smaller indicators that could
assist a sale of real estate. These are often verbally
transmitted and after a sale is completed, possibly lost.
There is a crucial link of information missing in land and
real estate transactions, and that is private information
known to the vendor and not necessarily legally required
to submit. This information could paint a full picture of
the property being sold. This information is diverse and
could range from the date a new hot-water cylinder was
installed, a recent repaint of a house, the paint used, the
new locks and alarm system, solar systems, etc. This
information would have a date, installers name, price,
and possible warranty. This would also ensure that
warranties are transferable to the new owner. This
information would also improve the code of conduct for
a large number of trades as a warranty, and their name
is now attached to the property. Figure 1 illustrates the
information asymmetry between a purchaser and vendor
of a real estate transaction by adapting Shannon and
Weaver model of communication [19].

Tacit Knowledge
Specialists
Government
Explicit
Tacit knowledge
Sender

Encoder

Channel

Decoder

Reciever

Lawyer

Buyer

Explicit check

Seller

Agent

Noise

Lawyer

Lawyer

Fig 1: AdaptationFigure
of Shannon
Weaver's
Model of Communication
1.and
Model
of(1949)
communication
for a

real estate transaction
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Akerlof’s seminal paper [2] states that information
asymmetry is prevalent in second-hand markets. The
vendor who has owned or used their asset for a while are
better informed about the state of their asset than the
purchaser. Since a purchaser usually cannot observe an
asset's real quality, an unscrupulous vendor could be
incentivised to sell at an overinflated price.
We have divided the process of purchasing real
estate into six specific stages. We designed the process
stages using two steps. The first step adopts the
hypothetical model created by Grum and Kobal Grum
[11] that related to the psychological factors involved in
the decision-making to buy real estate. The second step
involves synthesising the words used in the semistructured interviews.

Purchaser Decision Process
Dream

Research

Offer

Due
Diligence

Negotiate

Un
Conditional

Figure 2. The purchaser decision process
These six stages are not siloed, and in some situation
they could have overlaps. For example, dreaming and
researching for potential properties and locations are not
clearly defined and can easily transfer between the two
categories, but overall it establishes the thought process
of seasoned professionals in real estate.

4.1 Dream
At this stage, a purchaser is deciding where to buy.
From the perspective of a purchaser, the stakeholders
involved are local residents and real estate agents. We
refer to this as the dream stage. Getting an idea of area,
township, whether there is employment, the type of
neighbourhood, and a rough price indication. Generally,
a feel for the area is based on a subset of emotions. In
general key aspects/issues of importance are: local area,
feel, medical centre, township activity, transportation,
community offering, shop, cafe, school, neighbourhood,
and employment.

Once a potential choice is narrowed down more detailed
information is required, including section size,
government valuation, rates, development in the
immediate vicinity, current market analysis, storm water
and sewage. As one progresses on the research journey
it becomes clear that most of the information that is
required to take an informed decision is tacit rather than
explicit (Table 1). This represents the dark side of many
high-value low-frequency asset purchases which are
made with insufficient verifiable knowledge.

4.3 Offer
The initial offer is drafted by the real estate agent and
will nearly always have a few conditions in them. The
most common are LIM, finance, and builders report.
There are a host of other conditions that can be drawn
up depending on the specific circumstances. There will
also be a date set for the offer to go unconditional. At
this stage, the vendor’s and purchaser’s lawyers are
involved. The offer will have a final date set, and this
will give the time to resolve all conditions set in the
offer. An agreed deposit will be made into a trust
account. The basic issues/requirements that need to be
addressed before one can make an offer are: negotiate
price and have finance organised, requesting the official
title, fulfilling the anti-money laundering (AML)
requirement, adding personal conditions to the sale,
setting the due diligence period and pay the negotiated
deposit. The dark side in this stage is the uncertainty of
the verifiability of the information given.
Table 1. Tacit vs explicit knowledge in the
research phase
Tacit

Explicit

View
Growth
Opportunity
Future Development
Infrastructure
Limitation
Lifestyle

Price Range
Zoning
School District
Healthcare
Restriction
Storm Water
Internet Coverage
Rates
CMA
Government Valuation
Sewage/Septic
Size

4.2 Research
This stage involves a more focused approach. A
purchaser will find out their exact price range, dictated
by financial institutions and their own financial sense.
A real estate agent will provide specific information on
why buying in the area is beneficial.
By now, a purchaser will be narrowing down to a
specific property and discovering growth, employment,
infrastructure and opportunities in the area like health
care facilities, school zoning, and internet connectivity.

4.4 Due Diligence
This is the most important stage in a high-value lowfrequency transaction. This is where we need
counterbalance asymmetric information so that we can
uncover and address possible risks in the transaction.
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This last stage in gathering all the relevant information
pertaining to a property could be a costly and timeconsuming exercise, depending on the number of
reports needed or requested. At this stage, all the
stakeholders are involved. To organise finance, legal
descriptions on a title, specific questions on chattels and
specialists reports on the property. If the transaction
does not proceed for any reason, the information
collected from these reports will be lost, due to the fact
that the potential purchaser has paid for and owns them.
This gives the vendor the possibility to re-list the
property with the same issues as before without needing
to disclose or mitigate any problems identified by those
reports. The most common reports requested in the due
diligence stage are listed in Table 2. These reports often
verify the tacit information and transform them into
explicit information.

increase the asymmetric knowledge gap between a
novice purchaser and experienced agent. The study has
contributed to the literature in two ways. First, it has
created a framework to guide novice purchasers of real
estate in New Zealand. Second, the study contributes by
adding a layer of coding ability that could be further
developed by the real estate industry. The synthesised
Purchaser Decision Process Roadmap (Figure 3) could
benefit a purchaser by guiding him/her in the kind of
questions that need to be asked when purchasing real
estate in New Zealand. The further sub-categorising of
the questions into tacit and explicit would give the
possibility of partly standardising information and
implementing knowledge management systems into the
sales process.

4.5 Negotiate

Our model built for real estate in New Zealand could
potentially be generalised for real estate in other places,
or even other high-value infrequently traded assets, such
as the purchase of a diamond engagement ring.
Typically, purchasing a diamond engagement ring is a
low-frequency purchase and the information that needs
to be gleaned before making an informed decision is
information regarding: the diamond’s clarity, cut, and
carat, the country of origin, the designer of the ring, the
price, new or second-hand, fashion, etc. There is a large
discrepancy between the knowledge of a jeweller and
the knowledge of a novice purchaser, each with
conflicting objectives. If we could codify and categorise
the information, this would lead to a better informed
purchaser and a reduced likelihood of paying a premium
for example, due to their lack of knowledge. Although
there are similarities between purchasing a diamond ring
and a property, the long term financial impact is much
greater in the latter.
High-value infrequently traded assets are often
purchased through an intermediary and sometimes
checked by a third party. There is a disincentive for the
vendor, or the agent, to codify information as it is
currently not beneficially to the transaction. In other
words, the vendor and/or agent benefits from the
asymmetric information and can leverage it to
potentially sell at a higher price. Due to the infrequency
of trading, it is time-consuming and costly for a
purchaser to gain the level of knowledge required to
make an informed decision. Most of the stakeholders in
the transaction are highly organised: lawyers, real estate
agencies, financial institutions, councils and specialised
advisors (surveyors, geo-tech, etc.) and nearly all have
caveats releasing them on any inaccuracy of the
information provided. Unlike a purchaser who has little
legal recall if they purchased a "proverbial lemon." The

Depending on the results of the Due Diligence stage,
there are only three remaining options. Walk away from
the deal, renegotiate, or sign the deal. Once signed the
offer becomes unconditional.

4.6 Unconditional
At this stage the transaction is finalized. The deposit
is transferred into a trust account, and the title and
deposit redistributed (minus lawyer, real estate fees, and
rates expenses). The electricity, water, gas, phone, keys,
and chattels are transferred into the new owner’s name.
Finally, the sale price is recorded with the council.
Table 2. Reports requested during Duediligence phase
LIM Report
Builders Report
Title Requisition
Geo-Tech Report
Surveying
Valuation
Moisture Report
Electrical Report
Soil Testing

Valuation Report
Archaeological Report
Asbestos Report
Swimming Pool Report
Methamphetamine
Drainage Report
Landscape Report
221 Report Council
Insulation Report

5. Findings
The challenges faced by a purchaser is that explicit
information is often specialised propriety information
and derived from a multiplicity of sources with
conflicting objectives. Tacit information is often
verbally transmitted by the vendor or agent. Due to the
low frequency in purchases, tacit knowledge is used to

6. Discussion
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application of blockchain could be a potential solution
to store verifiable information onto a permissioned
distributed ledger with a shared database. This would
address information asymmetry in various ways. First,
all information would be timestamped giving the data a
historical context. Second, the information would be

verifiable and only entered through trusted nodes. Third,
it would give a legal recall to a purchaser if the
information used to make a purchase decision was
wrong. And, finally, information that previously had
been collected does not have to be reiterated saving time
and money.

Figure 3. The purchaser decision process roadmap

7. Limitations
This study is limited in several ways. It could be
argued that the number of interviews held to reach a
conclusion are less than ideal. Although according to
Myers [16] the representation of the various voices
within a group is more important than the sample size.
Also, the sample size should be dictated by the
saturation point of new insights, not by the number of
interviews. Our view, however, is that the saturation
point in this paper has not been reached and that the
geographical spread, the interviews were held within
one real estate company, impacts the generalisability of
the research. Although we believe the methodology can
be extrapolated to other industries dealing with highvalue infrequently traded assets, this is not conclusive.

Hence, more stakeholders from a wider range within the
real estate industry could be questioned resulting in a
more in-depth picture. In addition, the feedback gleaned
from the focus group identified a number of exceptions
in the industry. These exceptions can be investigated
using a multi-methodological approach to gather more
data from a variety of agencies. These limitations will
be further addressed in a PhD thesis including the
possible integration of blockchain to deal with the
asymmetric knowledge distribution.

8. Conclusion
The focus of this research is on counterbalancing
information asymmetry and in particular, the
asymmetry that exists in many high-value low-
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frequency transactions. We focus on one type of such
transaction, namely the purchase of residential property.
We gather information in the context of the New
Zealand real estate market and propose a process that
attempts to make the tacit, unverifiable knowledge
explicit. The presented purchaser decision process
model with the division of tacit and explicit information
(a) is a building block to address the information
asymmetry in the New Zealand real estate industry and
(b) presents an opportunity to introduce blockchain
technology into the real estate context. By storing all
possible explicit information and creating a history of
everything that has happened to the asset we will
hopefully be able to negate mistakes that can occur to a
novice purchaser when purchasing their new home. If
we can also use the decision process model as a learning
tool to understand the possible questions that could be
asked to make an informed decision when buying a
property, we can eliminate complications further down
the track. We believe our work can be generalised to
other high-value infrequently traded assets.
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